• integrated_82#Q4.3

A fully automated RAIDT implementation is described in the papers as an orchestration-led deployment in which the evidence layer is embedded directly into the operational workflow. In this form, the system logs run evidence straight into an evidence repository rather than relying on reviewers to reconstruct the event afterwards. For each material use, the orchestration layer captures the core contents of the run-level evidence pack: stable run ID and timestamp, prompt and template identifiers, model deployment and parameter settings, tool-call traces, retrieved context and retrieval snapshots, integrity hashes, output records, automated checks, and any recorded human review or escalation outcome. The score profile is then produced from those recorded artefacts, not from narrative claims.

The papers make clear that full automation does not mean that governance becomes fully discretionary-free. It means that objective evidence capture, completeness checks, and parts of scoring become systematic and rule-based. Auditability and Traceability can be assessed automatically from the presence and integrity of fields; Dependability can be supported by automated repeat-run tests under fixed settings; and threshold-based escalation can route low-scoring runs into human review. This aligns with the anchors 1=missing / 3=partial / 5=audit-ready because the automated layer continuously checks whether the record is sufficiently complete for reconstruction and challenge. At the same time, the evidence pack remains the source of truth, and judgement-heavy questions under Responsibility or Interpretability still require calibrated oversight. Fully automated RAIDT therefore looks less like autonomous compliance and more like durable evidence infrastructure for governed GenAI operations.

In a cybersecurity alert-triage workflow, a fully automated RAIDT setup would sit around the model as an orchestration layer. Every alert-handling run would automatically store the alert context, prompt version, model configuration, retrieval snapshot from the threat-intelligence corpus, output hash, suggested triage action, safety-filter result, and analyst sign-off. The system could then trigger repeat-run tests on a sample of identical alerts to measure variance and attach that stability evidence to the same run family.

If the resulting score profile shows weak Dependability or missing Traceability, the workflow can automatically require senior analyst review before action is taken. In this way, automation does not replace governance; it makes governance operational at service speed while preserving a reviewable evidential trail.

• 08-RAIDT_Foundations_M_V50
• 09-RAIDT_Empirical_M_V50.docx
• 18-RAIDT-Technical-Foundation_M_v04